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1 Introduction 
 
Since China entered the process of gradual transition in 1978, it has witnessed a pe-
riod of fast economic growth. This impressive growth record is often taken as a proof 
for the success of its transformation strategy, especially in the field of enterprise reform 
(Bohnet 1997; Lo 1999). The so-called commercialisation of its state-owned enter-
prises (hereafter SOEs) marked the first pillar of China’s gradual enterprise reform 
strategy. The government reduced the level of direct governmental control over mana-
gerial decisions within the SOEs and confronted them with a harder budget constraint 
without privatising them (Naughton 1994; Raiser 1995; Lin et al. 1998). At the same 
time, the Chinese government kept the entry to many markets served by SOEs re-
stricted. As a second pillar of its enterprise reform strategy, the Chinese government 
accepted the development of non-state enterprises (Young 1995: 14-19). As a result of 
this so-called grass-root privatisation (Brockmeier 1997: 364), numerous private enter-
prises were founded all over the country. In addition, local authorities installed an in-
creasing number of collective enterprises. In 1998, they employed 12.6 % respectively 
23.3 % of the total working population in China.  
 
Together, the commercialisation of SOEs and the grass-root-privatisation have pre-
vented a breakdown in production and GDP in the first years of transition. By gradually 
transferring labor force from SOEs to the non-state sector, China also managed to 
avoid high unemployment rates. Other than the people in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the China’s population was thus not burdened with excessive costs of adjustment to 
market structures in the early years of transition (Bai et al. 1997; Bohnet 1997). Though 
these achievements have to be recognised, the ultimate criterion for a successful tran-
sition in the long-run perspective is that of efficiency. The essential question to be an-
swered thus is whether the Chinese privatisation strategy has promoted overall effi-
ciency. So far, most studies on this topic have concentrated on the commercialisation 
of SOEs. The empirical evidence is not conclusive. In sum, however, it suggests that 
the commercialisation merely caused a minor increase in efficiency of resource alloca-
tion within the SOEs (Raiser 1995; Wu 1995; Liu and Liu 1996; Raiser 1996: 142-146; 
Lin et al. 1998). The impact of the grass-root privatisation on efficiency has not been 
analysed with the same intensity. The theoretical literature names a number of different 
ways in which non-state enterprises affect overall efficiency in transition economies in 
general and in China in particular. This literature is reviewed in section 2 of this paper. 
It gives support to the hypothesis that these enterprises, especially private enterprises, 
enhance efficiency in transitional China. Section 3 analyses the development of labor 
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productivity in 28 Chinese provinces between 1993 and 1998 in order to test the em-
pirical tenability of this hypothesis. A discussion of the results is given in section 4.  
 
 
2 The role of collective and private enterprises in transitional China 
 
Starting from the work of Pareto put forth on the turn to the 20th century, the concept of 
efficiency has witnessed several extensions (Leibenstein 1966; Lindbeck 1971). While 
the narrow concepts concentrate on a single production unit, the broader concepts re-
fer to the efficiency of economic processes of a region or a country as a whole. As an 
economy can only be efficient if all its production units operate efficiently, the broader 
concepts include all conditions that a single production unit has to fulfil to be efficient. 
The following passage briefly reviews the different dimensions of a broad definition of 
efficiency. 
 
The most commonly discussed concept of efficiency is that of technical efficiency.
1
 It 
demands that a given factor endowment is allocated among different producers and 
applications in a way that maximizes possible output. Technical efficiency implies that 
all factors are employed in the production process (Kohler 1989: 16-25; Bai et al. 
2000). Leibenstein (1966) furthermore demands that the process or production is or-
ganised in a way that minimizes shirking. Otherwise X-inefficiencies occur. A solution 
which is technically and x-efficient is located on the production surface and will hereaf-
ter be called efficient in production. If the chosen location is the one which maximizes 
consumers’ utility because it suits their preferences best of all feasible locations, the 
solution is structurally efficient (Kohler 1989: 21-25). Any situation which is efficient in 
production and at the same time structurally efficient is called statically efficient. The 
concept of static efficiency refers to the performance of a certain region or country at a 
given point in time and therefore takes consumers’ preferences, factor endowment and 
the state of technology as exogenous and constant (Mishan 1981; Bohnet 1984).  
 
In a medium-term perspective, these factors are likely to change. In order to be able to 
characterize the ability of an economy to deal with these changes, the concept of ad-
                                                 
1 Sometimes, authors further differentiate between technical efficiency and allocative effi-
ciency to describe the behavior of a single production unit. If both conditions are met, the 
unit is called profit efficient (Lovell and Schmidt 1988). 
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justment efficiency in introduced (Lindbeck 1971; Bohnet 1984). Adjustment efficiency 
is given if an economy adjusts to changes in production technique, factor endowment 
and consumers’ preferences at the lowest possible cost (Bohnet 1984). In addition, a 
number of authors have suggested concepts of efficiency which refer to the ability of 
the economy to actively move the production surface outward over time. This can be 
achieved by enlarging the factor endowment through investment (Lindbeck 1971; Sen-
gupta 1999). An economy which generates the optimal rate of factor accumulation is 
called growth-efficient. The degree to which an economy can move the production sur-
face by generating new technologies and products determines its efficiency in innova-
tion (Bohnet 1984; Funk 1996). If an economy meets the requirements of adjustment 
and growth efficiency as well as efficiency in innovation it is called dynamically efficient 
(Bohnet 1984). 
 
In reality, none of the existing economies live up to the high standards of static and 
dynamic efficiency developed in the theoretical literature
2
 They merely constitute a 
theoretical benchmark, measured by which all existing economies are inefficient. At the 
same time, economies differ substantially in the degree of inefficiency. In particular, 
centrally planned economies are regularly less efficient than market economies (Kornai 
1992; Blum and Dudley 1999).  
 
The following section addresses the question whether the acceptance of non-state en-
terprises in China has increased overall efficiency. It differentiates between primary 
and secondary efficiency-enhancing effects. First, these enterprises can increase effi-
ciency if they are on average more efficient than SOEs. The secondary effects result 
from the positive externalities that these enterprises produce for the SOEs as well as 
for the economy as a whole. The theoretical as well as empirical literature on the non-
state sector in transitional China points at a number of fundamental differences in the 
role of private enterprises on the one and collective enterprises on the other hand (e.g. 
Opper 1999: 110-135; Tian 2000; Rohde 2001). Therefore, the effects of these two 
types of enterprises have to be discussed separately. 
 
 
                                                 
2 An economy which sets optimal incentives for innovation and thereby promotes efficiency 
in innovation has to accept supernormal profits for the innovator. This automatically vio-
lates the conditions of efficiency in production and adjustment.  
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2.1 Primary efficiency-enhancing effects  
 
2.1.1 Primary efficiency-enhancing effects of private enterprises 
 
Following the property-rights logic, private enterprises can be expected to be more effi-
cient than SOEs because the property rights concerning their economic activities are 
more clearly assigned than for the SOEs. This gives the management the necessary 
executive power to decide and at the same time creates clear responsibilities for suc-
cess and failure (Kornai 1992: 62-74, 110-130, 140-145). As a result, the incentives to 
work efficiently are stronger (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Villalonga 2000). In addition, 
private enterprises suffer less from principal-agent problems. In SOEs, the principals, 
i.e. the equity owners, do not make the managerial decisions personally but delegate 
these to the agents, represented especially by the management. Due to the size of the 
SOEs and the complexity of their economic relations, the principals can only acquire 
very limited information about the quality of management. At the same time, monitoring 
is very costly (Villalonga 2000; Kessler and Luelfemann 2001). Thus the agents can 
use the delegated discretionary power to make decisions which maximize their own 
utility rather than the return for the principals. As a result, the delegation of power in 
SOEs leads to losses in efficiency, especially in form of x-inefficiencies (Moore 1981; 
Koop 1994: 293-297; Kessler and Luelfemann 2001). In the vast majority of private 
enterprises, management and equity owner are identical and thus pursue the same 
goals (Rohde 2001). Consequently, principal-agent problems do not occur and re-
source allocation in private enterprises can be expected to be more efficient than in 
SOEs. 
 
Private enterprises compete with each other as well as with collective enterprises. This 
competition forces them to produce their goods and services technically and x-
efficiently in order to remain profitable. SOEs are confronted with the disciplinary ef-
fects of competition only in those markets in which they are not protected by the gov-
ernment. In many markets, however, SOEs are still monopolists (Raiser 1995; Lin et al. 
1998). Due to the possibility to cross subsidize from monopoly to competitive markets, 
the competition from non-state enterprises exerts only limited pressure on them. There-
fore, SOEs can be expected to be less efficient in production than private enterprises 
(Koop 1994: 297-298.) 
 
In transitional China, government authorities still directly influence the managerial deci-
sions within SOEs. The governmental directives concern price policy, employment level 
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and in many cases the investment policy, too. The decisions are in many cases not 
primarily guided by the pursuit of efficiency but follow other political aims (Raiser 1995; 
Keister and Lu 2001). In particular, SOEs are burdened with the task or social welfare 
provision (Wong et al. 1996; Bai et al. 2000). In sum, the interventions reduce structural 
and productive efficiency in SOEs compared to private enterprises who are not subject 
to similar interventions (Opper 1999: 122-136; Rohde 2001).  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese legal institutions bear a number of obstacles for private 
enterprises. First of all, the institutional guarantee of their property rights is still not sat-
isfactory (Li 1996). Consequently, private enterprises face incentives to abstain from 
activities which require large specific investments. Second, the banking system dis-
criminates against private enterprises. While they accounted for 4 % of the officially 
registered equity in 1994, private enterprises only received 0.2 % of all banking loans. 
Instead, they have to rely on family members, friends and sometimes illegal sources for 
their financial means (Dong and Putterman 1997: 183-184; Schmitt 1999: 104-117). 
These institutional obstacles handicap private enterprises and prevent them from 
reaching the degree of efficiency they could reach in a more suitable institutional 
framework. Nevertheless, the considerations above suggest that private enterprises 
are on average more efficient than SOEs. Thus their emergence can be expected to 
enhance overall efficiency in transitional China. 
 
2.1.2 Primary efficiency-enhancing effects of collective enterprises 
 
Judging by the total number of employees, collective enterprises play a much more 
important role than private enterprises. Yet from a theoretical point of view, their han-
dling is less straight-forward. Formally, all collective enterprises are owned by the ur-
ban or rural community in whose sphere they are active. The community members do, 
however, not have the right to control the economic activities within the collective en-
terprises. Instead, the local authorities appoint and control the management (Opper 
1999: 106-107, 119-122; Tian 2000). Thus, these enterprises appear to be very similar 
to the SOEs and suffer from the same indistinct assignment of property rights, similar 
principal-agent problems as well as similar efficiency-reducing governmental interven-
tions. The literature on collective enterprises, especially on the so-called town and vil-
lage enterprises (TVEs) in the rural areas, points out that this conclusion is misleading 
(Bowles and Dong 1999; Tian 2000). There is a broad consensus among experts that a 
large percentage of collective enterprises, especially of TVEs, are only formally under 
government control. De facto, however, they face only moderate governmental restric-
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tions. Apart from being forced to employ too much staff, the collective enterprises are 
not subject to any severe interventions (Hu et al. 1997; Opper 1999: 104-121; Tian 
2000). Thus, Chinese collective enterprises can be expected to operate almost as in-
dependently as their private counterparts. At the same time, they benefit from the close 
relationship to the local authorities by having much better access to bank loans, land 
and restricted inputs, such as water and electricity than private enterprises (Dong and 
Putterman 1997; Bowles and Dong 1999; Rohde 2001). In addition, they can count on 
the local authorities to support them in possible legal conflicts (Tian 2000). As a result, 
their legal status and economic situation is much more secure.  
 
Many entrepreneurs, especially in the rural areas, purposefully choose the status of a 
collective enterprise respectively TVE to benefit from these advantages of this status 
(Hu et al. 1997; Opper 1999: 104-121; Tian 2000). This secure status allows collective 
enterprises to make specific investments that private enterprises will abstain from due 
to their uncertain status. The resulting increase in productive efficiency can compen-
sate for the losses caused by moderate government interventions. Due to the fact that 
collective enterprises are on average smaller than SOEs, the local authorities can very 
easily and thoroughly monitor the management decisions within their enterprises. Con-
sequently, principal-agent problems which lead to inefficiencies in the SOEs apply to 
collective enterprises only to a limited extent. The efficiency of collective enterprises is 
furthermore enhanced by the fact that they face competition from their private counter-
parts as well as from SOEs. In sum, China’s collective enterprises can be expected to 
be more efficient than SOEs. Therefore, their emergence increases overall efficiency in 
China.  
 
 
2.2 Secondary efficiency-enhancing effects 
 
Next to these primary effects, non-state enterprises also exert secondary efficiency-
enhancing effects. Theses secondary effects result form the fact that non-state enter-
prises produce positive externalities for the SOEs and the economy as a whole. Again, 
the effects will be discussed separately for private and collective enterprises.   
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2.2.1 Secondary efficiency-enhancing effects of private enterprises 
 
Private enterprises create a competitive environment for SOEs. This competition can 
help to reduce X-inefficiencies within the competing enterprises, especially within the 
SOEs (Leibenstein 1966; Moore 1981) and force them to introduce new techniques in 
management and production, thereby increasing overall adjustment efficiency. Till now, 
these positive effects of competition on product markets are limited by the fact that the 
economic activities of private enterprises are restricted to certain sectors. Private en-
terprises do, however, also compete with SOEs on factor markets. Jefferson and 
Rawski (1994) point out that competition for inputs reduced the dispersion of profit 
rates within the economy and especially among SOEs. In order to preserve the SOEs’ 
surplus income as a source of state revenues, the state government is forced to in-
crease SOEs’ efficiency. Without private competition, the government would have ex-
erted less pressure on SOEs (Jefferson and Rawski 1994; Bohnet and Hong 1996). 
Thus, the existence of private enterprises enhances efficiency in China’s SOEs. 
 
Apart from the positive externalities they exert on SOEs, private enterprises positively 
affect structural efficiency. As a substantial part of the private enterprises in transition 
countries engage in retail trade (Lageman 1995; Schmitt 1999: 191-202), they deliver 
industrial goods to the countryside and improve the supply of agricultural goods in ur-
ban areas (Young 1995: 13-24). On those product markets where private enterprises 
compete with SOEs, this competition reduced the social costs of monopoly by reducing 
commodity prices (Raiser 1997). Additionally, improvement in technical and adjustment 
efficiency can result if the retail trade activity of non-state enterprises increases the 
circulation of inputs and accelerates the diffusion of new technologies. 
 
In addition to improving availability and distribution of existing goods and services, pri-
vate enterprises produce new goods and services (Young 1995: 22-23). Especially the 
demand for light industry products, handicrafts and services is very difficult to satisfy by 
large organisational units like SOEs and the central planning agency (Rohde 2001). In 
socialist times, these markets were largely neglected and thus characterized by severe 
shortages and poor quality (Kraus 1989: 67-69; Young 1995: 22-23). The newly emerg-
ing private enterprises are mostly small and medium enterprises whose explicit 
strength it is to be able to observe and meet the differentiated demand in these fields 
(Kraus 1989: 67-69; Murakami et al. 1996). Therefore, their emergence lead to a sub-
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stantial increase in quantity and quality of supply in the field of light industry products, 
handicrafts and services.
3
 This further increases structural efficiency. In addition, it may 
improve the productive efficiency of those enterprises for whom the new products serve 
as inputs.
4
  
 
Private enterprises furthermore increase technical efficiency in transitional China by 
employing existing factors that have formerly not found a productive application in 
SOEs. Due to their lacking access to bank loans, especially private enterprises revital-
ize private capital, which have previously not served the productive process to the 
same extent because many private households were reluctant to give their savings to 
banks which are still under governmental control (Schmitt 1999: 104-113). The newly 
emerging private enterprises also absorbed parts of the superfluous labor force set free 
by the SOEs in the course of commercialisation.
5
 In the private enterprises, the labor 
force continued to contribute to overall output. In sum, private enterprises activated 
both labor and capital that would otherwise not have been integrated into the produc-
tion process and thereby improved technical efficiency in the course of transition.  
 
Numerous authors point out the important role of small and medium enterprises in 
promoting technical progress (Acs and Audretsch 1988; Hornschild 1997). In contem-
porary China, the contribution of private enterprises is still largely restricted to small 
product variations or improvements in production technology rather than fundamental 
new achievements (Schmitt 1999: 161-166). At the same time, the competition be-
tween them enforces a fast imitation and distribution of new technical knowledge and 
thereby increases adjustment efficiency. In addition, the mere number of private enter-
prises guarantees that a large variety of production as well as management techniques 
is tested at the same time. Following the evolutionary approach to technical progress in 
                                                 
3 The same development was observed in the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic) in the beginning of the 1990s (Lageman 1995). 
4 Like in all socialist countries, the shortcomings of the socialist planning system left plenty 
of room for economic activities in the informal sector. Thus, the corresponding “enter-
prises“ existed even before they were officially accepted by the Chinese authorities. Due 
to heavy restrictions for their activities as well as the often inadequate incentives, their 
contribution to overall efficiency in pre-reform China was limited (Lu 1994). 
5 This employment function was recognized by the Chinese officials and represents their 
major motivation to accept the development of the non-state sector including private en-
terprises (Young 1995: 21; Opper 1999: 122). 
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the tradition of F.A. von Hayek, this large real-life experiment raises the expected rate 
of innovation (Grupp 1997: 70-82). In sum, private enterprises can be expected to 
strengthen the dynamic efficiency of the Chinese economy.
6
 
 
2.2.2 Secondary efficiency-enhancing effects of collective enterprises 
 
The degree to which collective enterprises can produce similar efficiency-enhancing 
effects as private enterprises is discussed controversially (Bowles and Dong 1999; 
Rohde 2001). In many characteristics, both types of enterprises are similar and thus 
should be able to produce similar effects. Just like their private counterparts, collective 
enterprises compete with SOEs in different product and factor markets and thus induce 
efficiency gains in the latter. Especially the rural collective enterprises have developed 
substantial activities in the secondary sector where the SOEs are not so heavily chal-
lenged by private enterprises (Opper 1999: 104-121). Consequently, they can be ex-
pected to exert more direct pressure on SOEs than private enterprises do. Just like 
private enterprises, the collective enterprises absorbed large parts of the labor force set 
free by the SOEs. Due to their large numbers, they also contribute to the real-life ex-
periment on production and management techniques and thus increase the expected 
innovation rate.  
 
On the other hand, their effect on the efficiency of the capital market can be expected 
to be smaller than that of private enterprises, because they have better access to bank 
loans and thus do not have to rely on formerly inactivated sources for capital. More 
importantly, however, Rohde (2001) argues that the remaining level of governmental 
control hinders collective enterprises from developing the creativity in discovering new 
products and markets typical for small and medium enterprises. He thus concludes that 
collective enterprises cannot contribute to the development of efficiency to the same 
extent that private enterprises do.  
                                                 
6 Private enterprises have formed numerous interest groups. These interest groups inform 
politicians and bureaucrats about their specific situation and needs and exert pressure on 
the authorities to improve their position (Kraus 1989: 95-98; Lu 1994: 107-127). As the 
Chinese government knew about the vital contribution of these enterprises to China’s im-
pressive growth record (Young 1995), a number of important changes were introduced to 
foster the development of private enterprises.  
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3 Empirical evidence 
 
Wu (1993) differentiates between modern and classical methods to measure efficiency. 
Modern methods use information on the available technology as well as quantities and 
prices of all relevant inputs and outputs to estimate the location of an efficient frontier of 
production. The degree of inefficiency of a certain production unit, e.g. an enterprise or 
branch, is then estimated by the distance between its own location and the efficient 
frontier (Lovell and Schmidt 1988; Kalirajan and Shand 1999). Applied to cross-
sectional data, the methods can be used to compare the efficiency of different types of 
enterprises, e.g. SOEs and non-state enterprises, at a given point in time. In addition, 
the adjustment efficiency or the effect of a certain reform on technical efficiency within 
the production units concerned can be observed by tracing the degree of efficiency 
over time (Raiser 1997: 144-146; Villalonga 2000).  
 
Different from the modern methods, the classical methods do not estimate an efficient 
frontier and measure the efficiency of production units or countries by their distance to 
this frontier. Instead, these methods draw conclusions concerning the efficiency of dif-
ferent production units or countries by directly comparing their productivity (Wu 1993). 
This method can only measure the relative difference in efficiency but does not give 
any information about absolute efficiency. The major advantage of this indirect method 
is that the data requirements for its application are lower. Especially when trying to 
analyse the long-term dynamic efficiency of different enterprises or branches, the data 
to estimate the efficient frontier is often not available. Therefore, many studies in this 
field analyse the development of productivity over time (Atkinson and Primont 2002). 
Similar data problems usually occur in the analysis of transition countries when trying 
to study the development of efficiency in the course of reforms. Consequently, classical 
methods of efficiency measurement are frequently used in this field of transition eco-
nomics.  
 
A number of authors have used modern methods to study the efficiency of SOEs and 
non-state enterprises, especially of TVEs, in transitional China (Wu 1993). They con-
centrate on static efficiency, and therein particularly technical efficiency.
7
 TVEs were 
                                                 
7 The methods proposed for this purpose cannot differentiate between technical and x-
inefficiencies. Their  measure for technical inefficiency covers not only technical ineffi-
ciencies but also the degree of x-inefficiency by which the analysed unit exceeds the best 
one within the sample with respect to the latter type of inefficiency. 
 11 
found to be more efficient than other publicly owned enterprises (Murikami et al. 1994; 
Liu and Liu 1996; Murakami et al. 1996; Bai et al. 1997; Hu et. al. 1997; Zheng et al. 
1998). Next to these studies, numerous authors have applied the classical method of 
comparing productivity to analyse efficiency in different types of enterprises in transi-
tional China. Jefferson (1989) reached the conclusion that SOEs were on average 
more productive than urban collective enterprises, the data analysed by Zheng et al. 
(1998) suggested the exact opposite. The empirical evidence on the performance of 
private enterprises is comparatively sparse. Sverjnar (1990) found no significant differ-
ence between the productivity of TVEs and private enterprises, while Dong and Put-
terman (1997) reach the conclusion that TVEs to be more productive than private firms. 
In sum, non-state enterprises can be expected to be more productive and efficient than 
SOEs.  
 
These studies are, however, inadequate for measuring the full efficiency-enhancing 
effect of private and collective enterprises. In order to illustrate this, consider a region 
where non-state enterprises are active. Following the course of argumentation in sec-
tion 2, these enterprises first increase the efficiency of the overall region because they 
are on average more efficient than SOEs (primary effect). Second, they produce posi-
tive externalities which increase the efficiency of SOEs and thereby further raise effi-
ciency within the region (secondary effect). If the primary effects prove empirically rele-
vant, efficiency and productivity of non-state enterprises will exceed that of SOEs. This 
effect has been captured in the empirical studies mentioned above. If, however, secon-
dary effects are relevant as well, then they will increase the efficiency and productivity 
of SOEs and thus reduce the difference to the non-state enterprises. Instead of assign-
ing this impact to its true cause, i.e. the private and collective enterprises, the studies 
above wrongly assigned it to the SOEs. Thus, a mere comparison of efficiency or pro-
ductivity of SOES and non-state enterprises is inadequate to capture the full impor-
tance of non-state enterprises with primary and secondary effects in an empirical 
analysis. A different approach has to be taken.  
 
This paper compares the average productivity of provinces with different activity levels 
of non-state enterprises. The analysis is based on the assumption that the primary as 
well as secondary effects of non-state enterprises are concentrated in the region where 
these enterprises are active. Consequently, it can be expected that the stronger the 
efficiency-enhancing effects are, the higher the average productivity within the affected 
province. This in turn leads to the hypothesis that the average productivity within a re-
gion should be higher, the more active non-state enterprises are within this region.  
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This hypothesis will be tested by analysing labor productivity in 28 out of 30 Chinese 
provinces between 1993 and 1998. Tibet and Qinghai are omitted because the relevant 
data for these provinces is incomplete. The average labor productivity in province i in 
period t is measured by the real net value added per employee (NVAit/Lit)
8
. In order to 
capture differences in the capital intensity of production, depreciations per employee 
(Dit ) serves as the first explanatory variable. As the Chinese Statistical Bureau calcu-
lates depreciations assuming a constant depreciation rate, Dit is an ideal proxy for this 
purpose. A positive relationship between average labor productivity and depreciations 
per employee can be expected. The share of employees who work in private enter-
prises (LPEit) and in TVEs (LTVEit) are used as proxies for the activity level of the cor-
responding type of enterprises within one region. As the capital-intensive production in 
China is concentrated in urban areas, the share of employees in urban collective en-
terprises is highly correlated with the depreciations per employee. In order to avoid the 
danger of false conclusions due to multicollinearity, the employment share of urban 
collective enterprises is not included in the data-set.
9
 Instead, the share of labor force 
employed in all collective enterprises (LCEit) serves as an explanatory variables. Just 
like LPEit and LTVEit, it is expected to have a positive influence on average labor pro-
ductivity. The opposite effect can be expected for the share of employees in SOEs 
(LSOEit).  
 
In a first step, OLS methods are applied to estimate the parameters of a homogenous 
production function in a certain period t:  
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8 The real values are calculated using the overall retail price index. 
9 Both direct coefficients of correlation and variance inflation factors exceeded the critical 
values stated by Judge et al. (1988: 868-869). For the same reason, he share of employ-
ees in joint ventures (LJVit) is excluded from the data set. In transition countries, joint ven-
tures produce substantial spillovers in production and management techniques (Zu-
kowska-Gagelmann 2001). Therefore their employment share is expected to exert a posi-
tive influence on labor productivity. 
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The results are presented in table 1. The overall explanatory value is high in all years. 
While Dit turns out to exert a highly significant and positive influence on labor productiv-
ity in all regression approaches and years, the different labor shares perform much less 
impressively. LPEit produces positive estimators in virtually all set-ups and years. For 
1994 and 1995, these are significant for the majority of set-ups. LTVEit and LCEit pro-
duce significantly positive coefficients only for 1997. On the other hand, negative and 
partly significant estimators are observed for 1994. The coefficient estimators for 
LSOEit are negative in the vast majority of cases though scarcely significant. Finally, 
the intercept term decreases over time in the majority of set-ups. 
 
The extremely high values of the Lagrange multiplier statistic used to test the suitability 
of the isolated yearly estimations (Judge et al. 1988: 456) indicate that a high degree of 
contemporaneous correlation exists in this data set. Therefore better results can be 
obtained by estimating the set of six yearly equations simultaneously instead of sepa-
rately year by year. The pooling of time-series and cross-sectional data helps to reveal 
the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable more 
clearly because it substantially increases the degrees of freedom. At the same time, it 
makes it possible to answer the question whether the frequently observed decline in 
the intercept term is significant (Srivastava and Giles 1997). The following seemingly-
unrelated-regression-equations (SURE) approach is chosen (Judge et al. 1988: 468-
479):  
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The results of OLS estimations of this approach are presented in table 2. The overall 
explanatory value remains very high. Again, the depreciations per employee performs 
impressively in all set-ups. In addition, the significantly positive influence of LPEit indi-
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cated in table 1 is confirmed for all set-ups. The estimates for LSOEit are significantly 
negative in three of four cases. LCEit and LTVEit produce significantly positive estima-
tors in two of three cases but fail to do so in the set-up where both LPEit and LSOEit are 
included in the set of explanatory variables. The F-statistics for the ? t coefficients turn 
out to be highly significant. In all set-ups, ?1998  is significantly negative and ?1996  and 
?1997  produce significantly negative estimators in some cases.  
 
 
4 Discussion 
 
The results of the above regression approach can be interpreted in a cross-sectional as 
well as a longitudinal perspective. In the cross-sectional perspective, it gives evidence 
on the influence of a province’s share of employees in private as well as collective en-
terprises on its average labor productivity. Having controlled for differences in capital 
intensity of production, the degree to which the economy is agriculturally dominated 
and the share of SOEs and joint ventures, the results presented in the previous section 
show quite clearly that the larger the share of employees in private enterprises is within 
a province the higher is its average labor productivity. This result supports the hypothe-
sis put forward in section 2 according to which private enterprises increase overall effi-
ciency. A similar conclusion can be drawn for TVEs, even though the empirical support 
is less clear. Due to the fact that TVEs account for largest share of LCEit, the perform-
ance of the latter allows no conclusion concerning the efficiency-enhancing effects of 
urban collective enterprises.  
 
In an longitudinal perspective, the regression approach above points at three major 
determinants of the development in labor productivity in China between 1993 and 
1998. First of all, the capital stock per employee has doubled in the same period (see 
table 3). A second determinant is the shift in employment structure away from SOEs 
and in particular towards private enterprises. The third determinant is the decrease in 
the intercept term (?s + ? t). Contrary to the first two determinants, the latter has a nega-
tive effect on labor productivity over time. 
 
In combination, all three determinants have led to an increase in labor productivity of 
56.3 % between 1993 and 1998. In order to isolate the effects of each determinant on 
the average labor productivity in transitional China, a number of hypothetical scenarios 
have to be simulated. In these simulations, one or two of the above named determi-
nants are kept constant at the values of 1993 while the others take on the real values 
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for each year. The simulations use the functional form of equation (1) and calculate the 
simulated labor productivity by using the average values of the explanatory variables 
for overall China together with the coefficient estimators in the first row of table 2. Table 
4 contains the real and simulated development of labor productivity for China as a 
whole between 1993 and 1998.  
 
According to the simulation results, the increase in capital intensity of production would 
have raised average labor productivity by 77.9 %. Without capital accumulation, the 
estimated labor productivity is reduced by 10.8 %. The isolated productivity gains from 
the shift in employment structure would have increased the labor productivity by an 
estimated 10.4 % in the observed period of time. The strong discrepancy between the 
latter two figures is largely caused by the decline in the intercept term (?s + ? t), which by 
itself would have reduced labor productivity by –19.3 % according to the above simula-
tions. Together with the increase in capital intensity but disregarding the declining in-
tersect term, the shift in employment structure would have increased labor productivity 
by 96.4 %. 
 
The simulations clearly indicate that capital accumulation is the predominant driving 
force behind labor productivity increase in China in 1993 to 1998. This result stands in 
one line with previous empirical studies (Yusuf 1994; Hu and Khan 1997). At the same 
time, it is difficult to determine to what extent the increase in productivity results from a 
mere increase in inputs and to what extent capital-augmented technical progress con-
tributes to the increase in productivity. Though smaller in magnitude, the estimated 
impact of the shift in employment structure on labor productivity is clearly positive. As 
the increasing economic importance of private enterprises is the predominant feature of 
this shift, the results suggest that the reorganisation of economic processes which re-
duces governmental influence and increases private autonomy is an important source 
of gains in productivity and efficiency.  
 
When interpreting the results presented above, it is important to keep in mind that the 
official Chinese statistical data can for a number of reasons not be compared with offi-
cial statistics from Western industrialized countries. The published figures sometimes 
show fluctuations from one year to another which are very unlikely to reflect real-life 
changes. The extreme changes in LTVEit and LSOEit between 1996 and 1998 can be 
taken as an example for this note of caution. The author does, however, argue that 
these shortcomings cannot serve as a reason to doubt the basic results presented 
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here. Merely the magnitude of the effects, especially in the simulations carried out in 
this section, should be interpreted carefully.  
 
Apart from this precaution on data quality, the results are limited by the fact that the 
empirical analyses in section 3 cannot depict all efficiency-enhancing effects presented 
in section 2. In particular, the improvements in availability and distribution of goods and 
services as well as the reduction in social costs of monopoly do not raise the average 
productivity within a province. Thus the resulting increase in structural efficiency 
caused by the activity of non-state enterprises is not captured in the above regression 
approach. In addition, the proposed increase in innovation efficiency does in most 
cases not raise the productivity in the current or subsequent period but affects produc-
tivity in the medium range perspective. Though the SURE-approach taken above is 
generally capable of measuring these effects, the period of time observed in the study 
is too short to allow conclusions concerning the degree of dynamic efficiency in transi-
tional China.  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
China has experienced an exceptional growth in GDP since the reforms of its economic 
system began in 1978. In the course of this reform process, the Chinese economy 
massively increased the capital intensity of production. At the same time, the commer-
cialisation of the SOEs and especially the grass-root-privatisation strategy have led to a 
gradual but fundamental shift in the ownership structure. The growing share of urban 
and rural collective enterprises contributed to this shift. In addition, the emergence of a 
growing number of private enterprises marks an exceptionally important feature of this 
process.  
 
This paper analyses the contribution of both types of non-state enterprises to the ob-
served increase in labor productivity during the reform process. In section 2, it is ar-
gued that these enterprises are expected to be more efficient than SOEs. This fact 
constitutes their primary efficiency-enhancing effect. Further and more importantly, this 
paper points at the secondary efficiency-enhancing effects which result from the posi-
tive externalities that non-state enterprises produce in transition economies.  
 
Section 3 presents a simple empirical approach which tries to measure the full effi-
ciency-enhancing effect of collective and private enterprises in transitional China. De-
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spite the limited quality of the official data used, the analysis of average labor 
productivity in 28 Chinese provinces between 1993 and 1998 produced interesting 
results. It shows quite clearly that the fast capital accumulation represents the 
predominant driving force behind the increase in labor productivity in China. In addition, 
the growing importance of private enterprises was found to accelerate this 
development. The empirical results in this paper furthermore give strong support to the 
hypotheses that private enterprises as well as TVEs exert a strong positive influence 
on overall efficiency in transitional China.  
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Abstract 
 
Private and collective enterprises are expected to increase overall efficiency in transi-
tional China, partly because they are more efficient than state owned enterprises. More 
importantly, this paper argues, they induce efficiency gains in state owned enterprises 
and the economy as a whole. Empirical evidence from 28 Chinese provinces between 
1993 and 1998 gives support to this hypothesis by showing that the activity levels of 
private enterprises and rural collective enterprises have a positive effect on regional 
labor productivity.  
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 Table 1: Yearly OLS estimates for 1993 to 1998 
 
 
year ? ?  ? 1
 ? 2 ? 3 ? 4 ²R  
Lagrange 
multiplier 
statistic 
3.9729*** 0.7863*** 0.1946  0.0308 0.0679 1993 (2.9192) (5.3630) (1.2919)  (0.2054) (0.5601) 0.838 
3.2532*** 0.8688*** 0.3426**  -0.1817 -0.0667 1994 (3.6766) (8.7125) (2.6406)  (1.5888) (0.6921) 0.893 
2.7637*** 0.8820*** 0.2269**  -0.0429 -0.2068** 1995 (4.2443) (12.1778) (2.3650)  (0.5067) (2.5832) 0.931 
3.0357*** 0.8303*** 0.0977  0.0980 -0.1623* 1996 (3.9060) (9.7394) (0.8394)  (0.7648) (1.7459) 0.902 
3.9954*** 0.7224*** -0.0291  0.2769** -0.0382 1997 (4.6294) (8.1120) (0.3393)  (3.0089) (0.4380) 0.927 
2.5229*** 0.8679*** 0.0084  0.1045 -0.1292 1998 (3.0014) (10.4440) (0.0842)  (0.9932) (1.3307) 0.918 
210.0*** 
3.9938*** 0.7859*** 0.1922 0.0317  0.0770 1993 (2.8210) (5.3199) (1.2515) (0.2050)  (0.5436) 
0.838 
3.1796*** 0.8689*** 0.3719** -0.1919*  -0.1163 1994 (3.6320) (9.0574) (2.7890) (1.7916)  (1.1040) 
0.896 
2.7706*** 0.8788*** 0.2285** -0.0389  -0.2151** 1995 (4.3012) (12.6216) (2.3583) (0.5201)  (2.4929) 
0.931 
2.9186*** 0.8476*** 0.1214 0.0508  -0.1634 1996 (3.7968) (10.4032) (1.0445) (0.4457)  (1.6333) 
0.901 
4.0914*** 0.7313*** -0.0028 0.2294**  0.0239 1997 (4.5043) (8.1907) (0.0330) (2.8845)  (0.2368) 
0.926 
2.4458*** 0.8783*** 0.0141 0.0806  -0.1252 1998 (2.9534) (10.8973) (0.1407) (0.8738)  (1.2412) 
0.918 
205.5*** 
3.3793*** 0.8512*** 0.1979 -0.0174     1993 (4.0242) (10.0623) (1.3111) (0.1402)     
0.843 
3.9042*** 0.7876*** 0.3340** -0.1316     1994 
(6.7087) (12.7522) (2.5804) (1.4219)     
0.895 
3.9630*** 0.7506*** 0.1615 0.0512     1995 
(8.3253) (14.4963) (1.5723) (0.7084)     
0.917 
3.8251*** 0.7537*** 0.0661 0.1340     1996 
(6.9543) (12.6200) (0.5747) (1.2717)     
0.894 
3.9161*** 0.7480*** -0.0002 0.2174***     1997 
(7.5853) (13.9564) (0.0028) (3.6204)     
0.928 
3.2314*** 0.8065*** -0.0010 0.1280     1998 
(5.9846) (14.2097) (0.0010) (1.5073)     
0.916 
217.0*** 
 
* significant with ?  = 0.1. 
** significant with ?  = 0.05. 
*** significant with ?  = 0.01. 
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Table 1: Yearly OLS estimates for 1993 to 1998  (cont.) 
 
 
year ?? ? ? ? 1
 ? 2 ? 3 ? 4 ²R  
Lagrange 
multiplier 
statistic 
3.3495** 0.8166***  0.0884   0.0892 1993 (2.5103) (5.5408)  (0.5905)   (0.6232) 
0.834 
2.7019** 0.8588***  -0.0080   -0.0406 1994 (2.7790) (7.9107)  (0.0841)   (0.3520) 
0.866 
2.4648*** 0.8818***  0.0695   -0.1587* 1995 (3.5809) (11.6102)  (1.0783)   (1.7542) 
0.918 
2.7832*** 0.8498***  0.1244   -0.1330 1996 (3.6663) (10.4136)  (1.3869)   (1.3866) 
0.900 
4.0984*** 0.7310***  0.2288***   0.0235 1997 (4.7400) (8.4286)  (3.0241)   (0.2395) 
0.929 
2.4128*** 0.8804***  0.0861   -0.1235 1998 (3.1017) (11.3553)  (1.0518)   (1.2593) 
0.921 
213.4*** 
3.1869** 0.8272***     0.0737 0.0596 1993 (2.5821) (5.6993)     (0.4974) (0.4859) 
0.834 
2.7005** 0.8595***     -0.0093 -0.0389 1994 (2.8108) (7.7176)     (0.0884) (0.3633) 
0.866 
2.4730*** 0.8761***     0.0779 -0.1730* 1995 (3.5433) (11.0888)     (1.0589) (2.0122) 
0.918 
2.9522*** 0.8259***     0.1655 -0.1465 1996 (3.8539) (9.7664)     (1.6687) (1.6196) 
0.904 
4.0500*** 0.7208***     0.2668*** -0.0420 1997 (4.8670) (8.2592)     (3.1232) (0.4944) 
0.930 
2.5048*** 0.8689***     0.1083 -0.1285 1998 (3.1473) (10.7877)     (1.1644) (1.3569) 
0.922 
219.7*** 
3.4136*** 0.8480*** 0.1901   0.0045   1993 (3.7452) (8.9030) (1.2826)   (0.0321)   
0.843 
3.6969*** 0.8188*** 0.3327**   -0.1576   1994 
(6.1282) (12.0469) (2.6089)   (1.4627)   
0.895 
4.0050*** 0.7452*** 0.1827*   0.0293   1995 
(8.1963) (13.5657) (1.7399)   (0.3303)   
0.915 
3.9938*** 0.7273*** 0.0567   0.1645   1996 
(6.9662) (11.3482) (0.4773)   (1.2898)   
0.894 
4.2805*** 0.6937*** -0.0338   0.2959***   1997 
(7.6841) (11.7011) (0.4052)   (3.7086)   
0.930 
3.3629*** 0.7892*** -0.0035   0.1517   1998 
(5.9644) (13.3041) (0.0342)   (1.5073)   
0.916 
219.6*** 
 
* significant with ?  = 0.1. 
** significant with ?  = 0.05. 
*** significant with ?  = 0.01. 
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Table 2: OLS estimates for pooled time-series and cross-sectional data  
 
 
?s 3.2383*** 
(9.3546) 
3.2156*** 
(9.2331) 
3.6982*** 
(15.4314) 
2.9626*** 
(8.7888) 
2.9896*** 
(8.9547) 
3.7933*** 
(15.2511) 
?1994 -0.0198 
(0.4329) 
-0.0221 
(0.4850) 
-0.0118 
(0.2594) 
0.0075 
(0.1682) 
0.0093 
(0.2078) 
-0.0107 
(0.2313) 
?1995 -0.0717 
(1.4606) 
-0.0762 
(1.5620) 
-0.0567 
(1.1785) 
-0.0278 
(0.6162) 
-0.0237 
(0.5242) 
-0.0523 
(1.0676) 
?1996 -0.1012** 
(1.9919) 
-0.1078** 
(2.1530) 
-0.0834* 
(1.7096) 
-0.0556 
(1.2134) 
-0.0479 
(1.0412) 
-0.0741 
(1.4810) 
?1997 -0.1331** 
(2.1203) 
-0.1405** 
(2.2381) 
-0.0864 
(1.5329) 
-0.0585 
(1.0917) 
-0.0539 
(1.0074) 
-0.0810 
(1.3686) 
?1998 -0.2139*** 
(3.2490) 
-0.2266*** 
(3.5712) 
-0.1637*** 
(3.0021) 
-0.1439*** 
(2.6553) 
-0.1289** 
(2.3198) 
-0.1433** 
(2.4365) 
? s 0.8280*** 
(21.8627) 
0.8344*** 
(22.6311) 
0.7821*** 
(31.6716) 
0.8413*** 
(22.5517) 
0.8323*** 
(21.7032) 
0.7663*** 
(28.6447) 
s
1?  0.1047** (2.3298) 
0.1086** 
(2.4118) 
0.0919** 
(2.0630) 
  0.0933** 
(2.0613) 
s
2?   0.0491 (1.2408) 
0.0866** 
(2.5018) 
0.0943*** 
(2.6629) 
  
s
3?  0.0633 (1.4329) 
   0.1118*** 
(2.8323) 
0.0962** 
(2.2778) 
s
4?  -0.0886** (2.2741) 
-0.0807* 
(1.8960) 
 -0.0605 
(1.4288) 
-0.0785** 
(1.9982) 
 
²R  0.907 0.906 0.905 0.904 0.904 0.904 
F-stat. for ? t 30.51*** 30.85*** 28.85*** 31.13*** 30.82*** 28.26*** 
 
* significant with ?  = 0.1. 
** significant with ?  = 0.05. 
*** significant with ?  = 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Depreciations per capita and employment structure 1993–1998       
(average values for all 28 provinces) 
 
Year t Dt (YUAN/ 
capita) 
LPEt [%] LTVEt [%] LCEt [%] LSOEt [%] 
1993 663 5.48  20.59  26.15 18.11  
1994 727  7.20  19.64  25.00 18.22  
1995 824  8.91  20.71  25.72  18.03 
1996 953  9.86  21.60  26.41  17.87 
1997 1112  10.68  14.45  18.98 17.87 
1998 1328 12.56  20.18 23.33  14.50 
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Table 4: Simulated scenarios of China’s labor productivity development 1993 -
1998  
 
 Real  
values 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
intercept  
term V* V V C V C C 
Employment 
structure V V C V C V C 
Depreciation 
per capita 
 
V C† V V C C V 
1993 4239 4361 4361 4361 4361 4361 4361 4361 
1994 4534 4733 4384 4616 4827 4276 4472 4708 
1995 4980 5112 4268 4861 5492 4059 4586 5223 
1996 5532 5671 4198 5324 6275 3941 4645 5891 
1997 5969 6183 4027 5862 7064 3818 4601 6696 
1998 6623 6917 3889 6264 8566 3521 4816 7758 
1993 = 100 
1993 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1994 107.0 108.5 100.5 105.8 110.7 98.04 102.5 107.9 
1995 117.5 117.2 97.87 111.5 125.9 93.08 105.1 119.8 
1996 130.5 130.0 96.26 122.1 143.9 90.37 106.5 135.1 
1997 140.8 141.8 92.34 134.4 162.0 87.54 105.5 153.5 
1998 156.3 158.6 89.16 143.6 196.4 80.75 110.4 177.9 
 
* variable. 
† constant at the value of 1993. 
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